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Abstract 
This paper uses a new economic geography approach to examine the effects of wage subsidy, which is undertake to 
bolster up the industrial development. This paper also highlights the effects of trade liberalization and international 
capital mobility. In particular, sector-specific unemployment is introduced in the monopolistically competitive sector of 
the home country. 
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1. Introduction 
Many empirical surveys reveal that a large share of international trade has taken 
place between similar countries.
1 Actually, there is evidence that intra-industry trade 
occurs not only in industrial countries but also in developing countries.
2 There has 
been a proliferation of studies in the field of international trade under the context of 
inter-industry trade, but intra-industry trade has received less attention until recent 
decades. Comparative advantage, based on which the inter-industry trade emerges, is 
not powerful enough to explain the trade between similar countries. It is the concept 
of economies of scale that is used to explain this sort of trade.   
Monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) incorporates important 
features, such as product variety, consumer preference and market entry. Economists 
extensively employ the monopolistically competitive approach to establish an 
intra-industry trade model. Krugman’s (1980) model of intra-industry trade integrates 
production differentiation, economies of scale and imperfect competition. Now, this 
model has developed into the theory of “New Economic Geography” (hereafter NEG) 
to analyze industrial location. NEG mainly investigates the endogenous emergence of 
industrial agglomeration by incorporating monopolistic competition, economies of 
scale and iceberg transport costs.   
Krugman (1991) proves that firms and workers tend to agglomerate together, 
primarily because of the impact of increasing returns and transport costs upon labor 
migration. Involving two vertically linked industries, both of which are imperfectly 
competitive, Venables (1996) shows that linkages between upstream and downstream 
can be equally effective with labor migration in endogenously determining 
equilibrium locations. On the basis of a similar method, Krugman and Venables (1995) 
address the relationship among globalization, agglomeration and international 
inequalities, while Forslid and Midelfart (2005) explore industrial policy implications. 
These papers rely on the sharp assumption that labor is the single primary factor for 
production. Aiming to explore the crucial role of capital on trade liberalization, this 
paper develops a more general framework, where both capital and labor serve as 
primary factors for production.
3 
Ever since the influential papers by Krugman (1980 and 1991), NEG has attracted a 
great deal of attention in the literature, which is evidenced by the launch of the 
Journal of Economic Geography in 2001. Currently, applications of the theory of 
NEG have been popularized to the fields of international trade, regional economics, 
economic growth, and/or economic integration.   
In the real world, because of the uneven development between the urban and the 
rural, the phenomenon of unemployment is inevitable. On the other hand, due to some 
politically related reasons or the bargaining power of unions, the minimum wage is 
widely witnessed in the urban areas of many countries. Harris and Todaro (1970) 
analyze the formation of urban unemployment which is caused by institutionally fixed 
                                                        
1  See, for example, Greenaway and Milner (1986), Helpman (1987) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2003). 
2  See, for example, Tharakan (1984). 
3 The large bulk of one-country general-equilibrium models utilize both capital and labor as primary factors for 
production. However, the introduction of capital into NEG model is still relatively scarce.  2
urban minimum wage, paving the way for a series of subsequent discussion. To our 
limited knowledge, there have been no attempts to analyze the unemployment issue in 
the NEG framework, which motivates us to fill this gap. 
Besides this novel contribution, the present paper also introduces wage subsidy into 
the economy and investigates its effects. Wage subsidy is usually described as a 
prescribing policy sufficing to mitigate the negative effects of labor market distortion. 
As noted in Husby (1993), “an alternative policy that combines a minimum wage and 
a wage subsidy is superior to either by itself. Such a combination can assist the low 
wage worker, avoid disemployment effects, and maximize market efficiency (p. 30)”. 
According to the conclusion by Husby (1993), this paper implements wage subsidy in 
the urban area rather than rural area, since the minimum wage only prevails in the 
urban area. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a NEG 
model. In particular, sector-specific unemployment and wage subsidy are 
simultaneously introduced in the monopolistically competitive sector of the home 
country. Section 3 conducts numerical simulation for analysis. Conclusions are drawn 
in Section 4. 
 
2. The Model 
Suppose that the world is composed of two countries: the home (indexed by 1) and 
the foreign (indexed by 2). The consumers in each country consume a group of 
differentiated manufactured goods and a homogeneous agricultural good. The 
manufactured goods are produced by a monopolistically competitive sector (indexed 
by  X) with increasing-returns-to-scale technology, and the agricultural good is 
produced by a perfectly competitive sector (indexed by Y) with 
constant-returns-to-scale technology. Sectors X and Y are assumed to be urban 
manufacturing and rural agriculture, respectively. Following Krugman (1980 and 
1991), the agricultural good can be traded costlessly between countries in order to 
simplify the model. However, the trade of manufactured goods is subject to transport 
costs, which take the “iceberg” form. More precisely, if one unit of manufactured 
goods is traded from one country to another, only 1 t /  ( > t 1) unit will arrive.   
The utility functions of all consumers are assumed to be identical. We adopt simple 
Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
1 UD Y
δ δ − = ,  (1)
where D and Y are the consumption of the composite manufactured good and of the 
agricultural good, and  δ ∈[0,1] is the income share on the composite manufactured 
good. As in Dixit and Stigltiz (1977), the consumption of the composite manufactured 
good is defined as: 
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where xh is the consumption of variety h and σ >1 is the elasticity of substitution 
between each pair of differentiated manufactured goods. 
The price index of the composite manufactured good in country i is denoted by qi:  3
1/(1 ) 11 () ii i j j qn p n t p
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where pi is the price of manufactured goods produced in country i,
4 and ni is the 
number of varieties of in country i. It is noteworthy that, in equilibrium, each 
monopolistically competitive firm in the urban area produces a single variety of ni 
differentiated manufactured goods 
Let wXi, wYi and ri be the urban wage, the rural wage and the capital rental in 
country  i, respectively. In the home country, sector-specific unemployment is 
introduced into the manufacturing sector by assuming that the urban wage is rigidly 
set above the market-clearing level. Therefore, labor will migrate from the rural area 
into the urban area until the rural wage rate equals the expected urban wage rate: 
1 1 Y X w ew = ,  (4)
where  
) /( 1 1 U L L e X X + =   (5)
is the urban employment rate, and U and LX1 are the unemployed and employed labor 
in the urban area, respectively. The rural wage rate is flexible, so no unemployment 
occurs in the agricultural sector. In the foreign country, we assume that both urban 
and rural wage rates are flexible, ruling out the possibility of unemployment and 
leading to the same level of urban and rural wage rates, i.e., wX2=wY2≡w2. 
In the production side, the production of both sectors utilizes labor and capital. 
Perfect competition and costless trade are assumed in the agricultural sector, so that in 
both countries marginal cost functions equal the world price of the agriculture good: 
1
11 (, ) 1 Y gw r= , 
2
22 (, )1 gwr= ,  (6)
where the agricultural good is chosen as the numéraire and g
i is the marginal cost 
function of the agricultural sector in country i. 
The domestic government undertakes a specific wage subsidy in the manufacturing 
sector, and thus the domestic manufacturing firm will act as if the labor cost is 
wX1(1−s), where s is the subsidy rate, instead of wX1. Then we can define the marginal 
cost of each manufacturing firm in the home country as m
1(wX1(1−s), r1). Write it as 
m
1(wX1, r1,s) in order to simplify the exposition. No subsidy is offered in the foreign 
country, therefore the marginal cost of each manufacturing firm in the foreign country 
appears as m
2(w2, r2). 
Each manufacturing firm seeks profit maximization by choosing its price. We focus 
on symmetric equilibria, i.e., each firm adopts the same technology to produce. The 
cost function for a representative firm can be expressed as (F+ xi)m
i, where Fm
i is the 
fixed cost. Considering the preference à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the representative 
firm seeks profit maximization according to the equality between marginal revenue 
and marginal cost: 
                                                        
4 Under symmetric assumption, all manufacturing firms (in the same country) will charge the same price in 
equilibrium.  4
i
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where σ  is the elasticity of demand. This equation implies that in equilibrium, the 
price of manufactured goods is a mark-up over the marginal cost. Under monopolistic 
competition, free entry eliminates the profit of each firm: 
i
i i i m x F x p ) ( + = ,  (8)
where  xi is the output level of each manufacturing firm in country i.
5 Viewing 
equations (7) and (8) and choosing F=1/( 1 σ − ), these give that xi=1. 
Due to zero-profit condition, the equilibrium output level of each manufacturing 
firm must satisfy: 
11 1 1 ii i i i j j x pq I pt q I
σσ σ σσ δ δ
−− − −− == + ,  (9)
where Ii is the national income in country i. Note that the first term on the right side is 
country i’s demand for a variety of manufactured good produced in country i, while 
the second term is country j’s demand for the variety of manufactured good produced 
in country i.
6 
The national income in country i is defined as:
7  
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where Li and Ki are the labor and capital endowments in country i, respectively. 
Factor markets’ clearing requires that, in equilibrium, the supply of both factors is 
equal to the demand. Using Shephard’s Lemma, we can obtain the following factor 
market equilibrium conditions: 
()
ii
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where the subscripts of marginal cost functions denote partial derivative. 
In sum, the general equilibrium is specified by equations (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (9), 
(10), (11) and (12), which can be solved for Yi, Ii, ni, wY1, w2, ri, e, U, pi and qi. The 
parameters of the model are Li, Ki, wX1, σ and δ , which are exogenously given. 
 
3. Numerical Simulation 
Since this model is too complicated to solve analytically, we in this section assign 
key values to parameters and specify specific technologies to conduct numerical 
simulation as usual in such models.
8 Suppose that the marginal cost functions of the 
agricultural sector and of the manufacturing sector in both countries are: 
                                                        
5 Under symmetric assumption, all manufacturing firms (in the same country) will have the same output level in 
equilibrium. 
6  Detailed derivations of the demand functions see Fujita et al. (1999). 
7  In the home country, 111 . XY L LL U = ++   Taking into account the definition of e yields 11 1 1 1 . Y Iw Lr K = +  
8  See, for example, Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita et al. (1999).  5
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Meanwhile, we assign these values to the exogenous parameters:
9  
0.5 δ = ,  1 1.5 X w = ,  5 = σ ,  3 / 2 = α ,  3 / 1 = β ,  12 1 2 100 LLKK = === . 
The objective of this section is not to calculate the estimate of the effects of wage 
subsidy, since it goes beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the objective is to 
explore the direction of the change in each variable and to see the likely size of these 
effects.  
In what follows, we assume that labor is always specific to each country but mobile 
between sectors within each country. Our analysis begins with the scenario in which 
capital is also specific to each country, but it is mobile between sectors within each 
country. Later, we will relax the constraint on international capital mobility. Suppose 
that the domestic wage subsidy is set at s=0.2. Table 1 summarizes the simulation 
result of the effects of trade liberalization.
10 
Table 1. Effects of trade liberalization when capital is specific to each country and s=0.2 
  t=2.5  t=2.0  t=1.5 
e  0.680 0.682 0.686 
U  12.809 12.567 11.994 
n1  76.203 75.235 73.561 
n2  80.314 81.389 83.219 
p1  1.294 1.289 1.280 
p2  1.251 1.255 1.263 
Y1  91.297 92.813 95.415 
Y2  99.608 98.260 95.956 
wY1  1.020 1.023 1.028 
w2  0.998 0.996 0.990 
We can see from each column in Table 1 that the price of manufactured goods in 
the home country is higher than that in the foreign country (p1>p2). The reason is that 
the minimum wage in the urban area of home country makes the production cost of 
manufactured goods in the home country higher. Table 1 also shows that the varieties 
of manufactured goods in the home country are less than those in the foreign country 
(n1<n2), as a result, intra-industry occurs and the home (foreign) country is a net 
importer (exporter). Moreover, the foreign labor receives a lower wage than the 
domestic labor (w2< wY1< wX1), and the foreign country tends to produce more 
agricultural good (Y2>Y1). As long as the minimum urban wage is higher than the 
domestic rural wage, urban unemployment prevails in the home country.   
The trend of trade liberalization has totally different results across countries. 
Initially (the case of t 5 . 2 = ), the foreign country produces more varieties of 
                                                        
9  The condition thatα β > implies that manufactured goods are relatively capital intensive. 
10  Throughout this paper, we use the term “trade liberalization” sorely in the sense of a decrease in transport costs.  6
manufactured goods than does the home country (n1 < n2). Owning to 
increasing-returns-to-scale technology adopted in the production of manufactured 
goods, trade liberalization attracts the domestic manufacturing to the foreign country 
and widens the difference in the variety. This phenomenon is so-called 
“deindustrialization”. Let the difference between n1 and n2 represent the volume of 
intra-industry trade. The simulation result shows that the volume of intra-industry 
trade increases with the trend of trade liberalization. For the foreign country, the 
variety expansion constitutes an element of gains from intra-industry trade.   
On the other hand, trade liberalization will generate resource re-allocation. In this 
model, the demand for capital in the manufacturing sector decreases (increases) in the 
home (foreign) country, leading to an expansion (a constriction) in the supply of 
capital in the agricultural sector in the home (foreign) country since capital is 
immobile between countries. These results increase the domestic rural wage, which 
will attract some of the unemployed labor to the rural area, and thus the level of 
employed labor and employment rate change in the same direction as the domestic 
rural wage. In the meanwhile, these results decrease the foreign wage, and thus 
increase (decrease) the output level of agricultural good in the home (foreign) country. 
In sum, we can obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. When capital is specific to each country, the trend of trade liberalization 
has totally different results across countries. It leads to a decrease (an increase) in the 
price of manufactured goods in the home (foreign) country, a decrease (an increase) 
in the varieties of manufactured goods produced in the home (foreign) country, and an 
increase (a decrease) in the output level of agricultural good in the home (foreign) 
country. These results positively impact upon the rural wage, the level of employed 
labor and employment rate in the home country but negatively impact upon the wage 
in the foreign country. 
Another issue we concern about is the effects of wage subsidy. Suppose that the 
transport costs are fixed at t=1.5. Table 2 summarizes the simulation result. 
Table 2. Effects of wage subsidy when capital is specific to each country and t=1.5 
  s=0.2  s=0.4  s=0.5 
e  0.686 0.685 0.690 
U  11.994 19.040 24.974 
n1  73.561 95.892  115.169 
n2  83.219 70.610 60.248 
p1  1.280 1.165 1.085 
p2  1.263 1.214 1.176 
Y1  95.415 61.050 30.239 
Y2  95.956 111.568  123.951 
wY1  1.028 1.027 1.035 
w2  0.990 1.030 1.063 
Initially (the case of s=0.2), the foreign country produces more varieties of 
manufactured goods than does the home country (n1<n2), and the home (foreign) 
country is a net importer (exporter). However in the cases of s=0.4 and s=0.5, that  7
will be reversed (n1>n2) and the home (foreign) country becomes the net exporter 
(importer). The volume of intra-industry trade is always increasing.   
Wage subsidy exerts a cost-reducing effect from the point view of manufacturing 
firms, therefore the price of manufactured goods in the home country decreases with 
the increase in wage subsidy and thus the production of domestic manufacturing is 
promoted at the expense of foreign manufacturing. The home country demands more 
manufactured goods but less agricultural good, so the production of foreign 
agriculture is promoted at the expense of domestic agriculture. Therefore, balance of 
trade can be maintained. These results increase the foreign wage. In the home country, 
theses results make the urban area more attractive and induce some of the agricultural 
labor to migrate to the urban area where they may be employed. It will negatively 
impact upon the level of employed labor in the home country. The change in domestic 
rural wage depends on the degree of wage subsidy, so does the urban employment rate. 
In sum, we can obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 2. When capital is specific to each country, an increase in the wage subsidy 
leads to a decrease in the price of manufactured goods in both countries, an increase 
(a decrease) in the varieties of manufactured goods in the home (foreign) country, and 
a decrease (an increase) in the output level of agricultural good in the home (foreign) 
country. These results negatively impact upon the level of employed labor in the urban 
area in the home country but positively impact upon the wage in the foreign country.   
In order to identify the features of international capital mobility, we next analyze 
the other scenario, in which no constraint on capital mobility is placed, i.e., capital is 
mobile both between sectors and countries. In equilibrium, both countries have the 
same capital rental. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the simulation results of the effects of 
trade liberalization when the wage subsidy is set at s=0.2, and the effects of wage 
subsidy when transport costs are set at t=1.5, respectively. 
Table 3. Effects of trade liberalization when capital is mobile internationally and s=0.2 
  t=2.5  t=2.0  t=1.5 
e  0.673 0.672 0.671 
U  12.976 12.447  9.215 
n1  73.129 70.206 51.333 
n2  83.250 86.308  106.075 
p1  1.313 1.313 1.317 
p2  1.239 1.239 1.242 
Y1  91.352 93.668  108.684 
Y2  99.776 97.809 85.063 
wY1  1.009 1.009 1.006 
w2  0.673 0.672 0.671 
Compared with Table 1, we find that similar effects exist between with and without 
international capital mobility in the employed level of the home country, the varieties 
of manufactured goods in both countries and the output levels of agricultural good in 
both countries. In addition, we can demonstrate that international capital mobility 
enhances the effects of trade liberalization upon these variables. However, when  8
transport costs are not that high, different effects exist in the urban employment rate, 
the price of manufactured goods and the rural wage in the home country.   
When capital is allowed to be mobile internationally, the scale of domestic (foreign) 
manufacturing is less (larger) than that without international capital mobility. It 
indicates that the capital removes from the home country to the foreign country, which 
in turn makes the scale of domestic (foreign) manufacturing shrink (expand). When 
transport costs are not that high, the scale of domestic (foreign) manufacturing shrinks 
(expands) quickly with the trend of trade liberalization. Therefore, we can argue that 
international capital mobility accelerates the deindustrialization of the home country. 
Moreover, in view of the increasing-returns-to-scale technology in the production of 
manufactured goods of both countries, the price of manufactured goods in the home 
(foreign) country is higher (lower) than that without international capital mobility. 
Table 4. Effects of wage subsidy when capital is mobile internationally and t=1.5 
  s=0.2  s=0.4  s=0.5 
e  0.671 0.686 0.706 
U  9.215 19.213  27.662 
n1  51.333 97.452  141.685 
n2  106.075 69.227  38.889 
p1  1.317 1.162 1.053 
p2  1.242 1.215 1.181 
Y1  108.684 59.940  9.582 
Y2  85.063 112.256  135.7891 
wY1  1.006 1.029 1.058 
w2  0.671 0.686 0.706 
In contrast with Table 2, an increase in wage subsidy unambiguously increases the 
rural wage and urban employment rate in the home country. Nonetheless, similar 
effects exist between with and without international capital mobility upon other 
variables.  
Compared with Table 2, international capital mobility enhances the effects of wage 
subsidy. When capital is allowed to be mobile internationally, the scale of domestic 
(foreign) manufacturing expands (shrinks) much more quickly than that without 
international capital mobility, suggesting that the capital removes from the foreign 
country to the home country. Similarly, the scale of domestic (foreign) agriculture 
shrinks (expands) much more quickly than that without international capital mobility. 
Therefore, if the rate of wage subsidy continues to increase, the home country will 
become a manufacturing “core” but an agricultural “periphery”, while the foreign 
country will become an agricultural “core” but a manufacturing “periphery”. The 
simulation result shows that such a rate of wage subsidy that industrial agglomeration 
occurs lies between 0.51 and 0.52. 
Therefore, we can obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. No matter whether the wage subsidy or the trend of trade 
liberalization works, international capital mobility accelerates the deindustrialization 
of the home country.  9
 
4. Conclusions 
    This paper sets up a NEG model with sector-specific unemployment to examine the 
effects of wage subsidy and trade liberalization. There are two alternative scenarios: 
first, capital is specific to each country and second, capital is mobile internationally. 
When capital is specific to each country, it is shown that trade liberalization attracts 
the domestic manufacturing to the foreign country, resulting in positive effect upon 
employment but deindustrialization. Furthermore, wage subsidy promotes the 
production of domestic manufacturing at the expense of foreign manufacturing.   
When capital is mobile internationally, the direction of capital mobility is 
completely different with respect to which element works. However, no matter 
whether the wage subsidy or the trend of trade liberalization works, international 
capital mobility accelerates the deindustrialization of the home country. 
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